False Aspectarians: Difference between revisions
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'''False Aspectarians''' (Skt. ''nirākāravādin''; Tib. རྣམ་རྫུན་པ་, ''namdzunpa'' | '''False Aspectarians''' (Skt. ''nirākāravādin''; Tib. རྣམ་རྫུན་པ་, ''namdzunpa'', [[Wyl.]] ''rnam rdzun pa'') — a subschool of the [[Chittamatra]]. They say that the aspects of mind which appear as external are false and that it is only the perceiving mind which really exists. They say that mental aspects which appear as outer objects are just like the false perceptions of falling hairs, a yellow conch shell (to someone with jaundice), or two moons. They say there is only the subjective mind and there are no outer objects. To say that the mental images (Tib. [[རྣམ་པ་]], ''nampa'', Wyl. ''rnam pa'') are real would mean that a person must have several minds. Or, they say, if there is only one mind, how could it produce the plurality of perceived aspects? Or if there are many subjects and only one object, that is also problematic, because subject and object are dependently originating. | ||
==Alternative Translations== | ==Alternative Translations== | ||
*Chittamatrins who hold that sense data are false ([[LCN]]) | *Chittamatrins who hold that sense data are false ([[LCN]]) | ||
*"Representation-free" Yogācāra (Seton) | |||
==Internal Links== | ==Internal Links== | ||
Latest revision as of 21:08, 5 October 2020
False Aspectarians (Skt. nirākāravādin; Tib. རྣམ་རྫུན་པ་, namdzunpa, Wyl. rnam rdzun pa) — a subschool of the Chittamatra. They say that the aspects of mind which appear as external are false and that it is only the perceiving mind which really exists. They say that mental aspects which appear as outer objects are just like the false perceptions of falling hairs, a yellow conch shell (to someone with jaundice), or two moons. They say there is only the subjective mind and there are no outer objects. To say that the mental images (Tib. རྣམ་པ་, nampa, Wyl. rnam pa) are real would mean that a person must have several minds. Or, they say, if there is only one mind, how could it produce the plurality of perceived aspects? Or if there are many subjects and only one object, that is also problematic, because subject and object are dependently originating.
Alternative Translations
- Chittamatrins who hold that sense data are false (LCN)
- "Representation-free" Yogācāra (Seton)