Two truths
Two truths. Everything has an absolute aspect (döndam [Tib.], or absolute truth, döndam denpa [Tib.]) and a relative aspect (kunzob [Tib.], or relative truth, kunzob denpa [Tib.]). The absolute or ultimate is the inherent nature of everything, how things really are. The conventional or relative is how things appear. In the teachings, these are known as ‘the two truths’, but they are not to be understood as two separate dimensions, rather as two aspects of a single reality.
A Teaching by Dzongsar Khyentse Rinpoche
When we talk about truth, it is like a basic instinct that we have. Truth is something that we
adopt, and what is not true, or fake, is something that we do not adopt. For example, we
distinguish between genuine Italian leather – truth – and fake leather made in Thailand. We do
this. You should also notice that without the imitation, there is no such thing as something
genuine. If it were not for imitations, advertisers could not brag about how genuine their
products are. But in the ordinary world distinctions such as fake and truth, genuine and
imitation, are completely taken for granted. There is not much reasoning behind them. The
decisions are mostly made by common or majority agreement, or by direct cognition, such as
when you touch the fire and it has heat, so you decide that from now on it is hot. That is as far as
it goes, and it does not go very far.
I am telling you this because the ideas of true and not true are the basis upon which we develop
our philosophies, ethics, religions and everything else. For example, the Vedic religions have the
idea that God is truth. Again, you can see here that the definition of truth is something that is not
a fake. It is something that is unfabricated, something that has always been there whether you
fabricate it or not, something independent from all causes and conditions. It is like the difference
between magic and non-magic. For example, this tent is true; it is real, because it is not
dependent on a magician. If a magician were somehow to display a magical tent, then it would
be a fake. The magician would have created it, and it would be dependent on him. We would
say that it was his idea, his trick.
So, many of these Vedic religions believe that God is truly existent. It is independent from
causes and conditions; human beings do not fabricate it. It is not a fake; it is there all the time.
And the rest is all maya, or illusion. This is what they believe.
I think that Christianity, Islam and Judaism must also talk about truth and non-truth, although
they may not use this language. We can debate this, but I think that there must be a right and
wrong way of doing things – ethics. Why is going to church every Sunday the right way? There
must be a view, and as we go on, they will say things like it is because God is the only merciful
one, and so on. If we ask why killing is bad, they will have another answer: because it is against
this and against that. The distinction between truth and non-truth is always there. In other
words, they are establishing a truly existent phenomenon.
The Vaibhashika school in Buddhism has extensively defeated the idea or notion of God, and
shown that it is a fabrication of whatever the religion. For the Vaibhashikas, only two smallest things exist: a very small thing like an atom, and a very small particle of mind. This is why we
call them Vaibhashika, which means ‘proponent of discrete entities’ (wyl. bye brag smra ba). The
Sautrantika view is very similar, although there are some differences. The Cittamatra school has
extensively defeated these ideas of the Vaibhashikas and Sautrantikas, and they conclude that
only mind is truly existent. Everything else is just an illusion, made in Thailand. Mind is the
only one that is genuine leather.
But a Prasangika does not believe in genuine leather. Well, he believes in genuine leather, but
not in truly existent genuine leather. He thinks that if it exists, then it has to have a birth. And if
it is truly existent, then it has to come from self, other, both or neither. Since he will refute all of
these possibilities when he examines them, he concludes that it cannot exist. So, if you ask him,
well in that case what would you accept, he would say, “dependent arising”. Without genuine
leather, there is no imitation leather. Without imitation leather, there is no genuine leather.
Genuine is dependent on imitation, and imitation is dependent on genuine. This is his
philosophy, so for him there is no such thing as a real cause.
--From Introduction to the Middle Way,Chandrakirti’s Madhyamakavatara with commentary by Dzongsar Khyentse Rinpoche, Khyentse Foundation, 2003, pp.88-89, for free download at www.khyentsefoundation.org